Central ideas in the English School
The ‘English School’ label was first written down by Roy Jones in 1981. According to Hall, Dunne and Wheeler’s commitment to solidarism and constructivism eschew some of the English School’s foundational ideas such as the centrality of states, importance of power politics and a deep skepticism about the possibility of different political communities reaching agreement on substantive political matters.
A third perspective, somewhere between these two poles, has arisen as a result of the increased dialogue between English School ideas and other worldviews – most notably realism and constructivism.[1]
Constructivism is a broad church; constructivists share three common concerns that also resonate with English School theorists.
First, they argue that normative and ideational structures are just as important as material structures, an idea that relates closely to the English School’s ideas of international theory as normative theory and the importance of interpretivism.
The second common concern is that ideational structures shape the identities and therefore interests of actors in world politics.
The third common view is that the relationship between agents and structures is mutually constitutive.
Constructivism attempts to find a synthesis between approaches that focus on the actions of actors and the way that they create political institutions and ideologies and structural approaches, including neorealism and Marxism, which hold that political action is shaped by socioeconomic and historical structures.[2]
The social structures that constitute and constrain states in international society are themselves constructed and maintained by social interaction between states, a point commonly accepted by English School theorists. It is important, however, to recognize that the English School and constructivism are not synonymous.
In particular, the School is committed to methodological pluralism and a tripartite conception of world politics.[3]
For Wight, ‘realist’ worldviews and practices are based on ‘power politics’. They emphasize the inherent conflict between states, the anarchical condition of world politics and the role of war as the ultimate arbiter.[4]
Realism refers to a leader’s primary responsibility for the welfare of citizens. In contractarian terms, a state can be understood as having a contract to secure its own citizens. Realism operates under the assumption that states are the only actors on the political stage, also known as ‘statism’ and ‘individualism’.[5]
Additionally, the states work in an anarchical system, meaning in the absence of higher, trans-governmental and universally recognizable authority no rules are applied in the international realm. The other assumption is that politics is driven by law of human behavior- the mix of urges like the drive for powers, will to dominate, self-interest and ambition.
Major differences between three traditions of the English School: realism, rationalism and revolutionalism
The ‘three traditions’ idea was Wight’s response to his own observation that there was no discrete body of international theory separable from legal, historical and philosophical forms of knowledge. There are two ways to understand the meaning of tradition.
The first is to see a tradition as a form of intellectual inheritance. A tradition is a mode of thought handed down through generations. Participants in a tradition believe that what they are doing and how they are thinking can be traced to past generations.[6]
Тraditions are externally constructed and imposed – they are not descriptions of the way things really are but categories to enable our understanding. Second, they are sets of ideas or modes of thinking, not really existing objects.[7]
As was mentioned before, for Wight, ‘realist’ worldviews and practices are based on ‘power politics’. They emphasize the inherent conflict between states, the anarchical condition of world politics and the role of war as the ultimate arbiter.
‘Rationalism’ sits somewhere between realism and revolutionism though there is considerable debate over which pole it is closest to. Rationalism is based on the notion that the world’s diverse communities and cultures are housed in states that together form an international society. Rationalists insist that states can agree to construct and follow rules that facilitate their mutual existence and prosperity.[8]
Whilst rationalism is often dubbed the ‘Grotian conception’ of international society, it is important to recognize that there are at least two rationalist ‘strands’ within the English School.[9] Both accept the idea that states form an international society, but they disagree about what type of society it is. Those that accept a Vattelian or pluralist view of international society argue that states are only bound by whatever rules they consent to.
Others hold a Grotian or solidarist view.[10] The Grotian view differs from the Vattelian in at least two ways. First, Grotius argued that states had an inherent right to defend themselves and to punish those who commit basic wrongs. Second, the Grotian perspective holds that states are bound to obey international law irrespective of whether they consent to be so bound.
The third tradition is revolutionism, which can be either benign or malevolent. Revolutionists share a belief in moral universalism. Whereas rationalists insist that moral values derive from the society and state in which they exist, revolutionists argue that certain moral principles are universal.[11]
Wight and Bull were both skeptical about revolutionism. Wight associated it with fascist and communist movements that wanted to replace international society violently with a global government in its own image. Bull was concerned that revolutionism or the quest for global distributive justice would ultimately destroy global order and replace it with unmitigated anarchy. [12]
As Jackson pointed out, each tradition could be thought of as a layer of responsibility confronting political leaders which taken together point to the important normative and pragmatic dilemmas that shape world politics.
Similarities between English School and Realism
The foundational claim of the English School is that sovereign states form a society, albeit an anarchic one in that they do not have to submit to the will of a higher power.[13] There is, they argue, a surprisingly high level of order and a surprisingly low level of violence between states given that their condition is one of anarchy.
This is not to suggest that the English School ignores the phenomenon of violence in relations between states. Its members regard violence as an endemic feature of the ‘anarchical society’ but they also stress that it is controlled to an important extent by international law and morality.[14] Even so, confusion about the central purpose of the School can result from the fact that its members seem distinctively realist at times.
Members of the English School are attracted by elements of realism and idealism, yet gravitate towards the middle ground, never wholly reconciling themselves to either point of view.[15] Members of the English School maintain that the international political system is more civil and orderly than realists and neo-realists suggest. However, the fact that violence is ineradicable in their view puts them at odds with utopians who believe in the possibility of perpetual peace.[16]
The English School recognizes that each approach contains insights about the condition of international politics. The realist’s claim that states, unlike individuals in civil society, are forced to provide for their own security in the condition of anarchy is valuable, as is its emphasis on how adversaries seek to outmaneuver, control and overpower one another.[17]
However, this perspective captures only part of the substance of world politics. The international system is not a state of war despite the fact that each state has a monopoly of control of the instruments of violence within its territory.[18] Because of a common interest in placing restraints on the use of force, states have developed the art of accommodation and compromise which makes an international society possible.
Three pillars of English School
Whilst realism, rationalism and revolutionism are sets of ideas about the way the world is and how to shape it best, ‘international system’, ‘international society’ and ‘world society’ are analytical devices to help us understand the global polity at any particular historical juncture.[19] They are labeled as triad the three pillars of English School theorizing.
According to Bull, an international system is formed whenever states are in regular contact with one another and where
‘there is interaction between them, sufficient to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculation of the other’.[20]
Beyond the simple assertion that states comprise an international society, there are important differences about the type of international society we live in today and the type we ought to live in. As Buzan argues, it is a debate about both the
‘degree and institutionalization of shared interests and values’ and about the ‘collective enforcement of rules’.[21]
Both pluralist (Vattelian) and solidarist (Grotian) conceptions contain descriptive as well as prescriptive components. To date, both of these approaches have tended to assume that international society is a society of states and to focus on the types of diplomatic and legal intercourse and historical analyses that informed early English School approaches. The dialogue between pluralism and solidarism helps to highlight the important tension between conceptions of order and justice in IR.
By contrast, ‘world society’ is much less well defined. Manning describes it as the society of ‘all mankind’ which exists ‘within, beneath, alongside, behind and transcending’ the society of states.[22] Martin Wight, too, has a vague concept of a world society united by a thin common culture. For Wight, all international societies are subsystems of this wider world society.
Bull himself identified world society as ‘a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another’ and insisted that it was held together by ‘a sense of common interest and common values’.[23] Later, Bull even went as far as identifying ‘human rights’ as the basic value that bound world society together.
The three traditions are modes of thought carried by diplomats, politicians, intellectuals and other individuals in the three pillars that comprise global politics (international system, international society and world society). Thinking of international system, international society and world society in this way raises important questions about the relationship between the three pillars.[24]
Kantian concept of world politics and “benign” and “malevolent” revolutionalism
The third tradition is revolutionism, which can be either benign (Bull’s ‘Kantian’ perspective) or malevolent (e.g. Marxist or Islamic fundamentalist). Revolutionists share a belief in moral universalism. Whereas rationalists insist that moral values derive from the society and state in which they exist, revolutionists argue that certain moral principles are universal.[25]
As Bull put it, the universal imperative has been
‘fed by a striving to transcend the states system so as to escape the conflict and disorder that have accompanied it’.[26]
Wight and Bull were both skeptical about revolutionism. Wight associated it with fascist and communist movements that wanted to replace international society violently with a global government in its own image. Bull was concerned that revolutionism or the quest for global distributive justice would ultimately destroy global order and replace it with unmitigated anarchy.[27]
More recently, however, revolutionism has become associated with a Kantian conception of world politics based on the idea that there is a world society of individuals that comes prior to the society of states. From this perspective, sovereignty and other international rules should be understood as instrumental values because they derive from states responsibility to protect the welfare of their citizens, and when states fail in this duty, they lose their sovereign rights.[28]
Kant held that revolution, even against a tyrant, is always impermissible, but he did not make a compelling case for this extremely conservative position. Kant was mistaken to hold that participation in revolution is always wrong; his position is compatible with his insistence that rulers are bound by justice and his hopeful attitude toward the French Revolution.[29]
Kant is adamant in his stand against instigating and participating in revolutions against the de facto rulers of the state.[30] Regardless of how tyrannical the head of state may be, Kant says, no person has the right to attempt to overthrow him. Revolutionaries must be punished by death, he insists, even if their motives were honorable.
Even so, Kant was optimistic about revolutions as forces for moral progress that we might otherwise never achieve.[31] He was known as a supporter of the French Revolution, reportedly referred to as “the old Jacobin.” The way the French Revolution inspired spectators throughout Europe, Kant says, was among the most significant events in history, for it reflected a moral disposition that gives hope for continuing moral progress.[32]
With the decline of Marxism-Leninism, fundamentalist Islam now stands as the world’s leading anti-American ideology. The problem facing us is not Islam (a religion) but fundamentalist Islam (an ideology). We can oppose the ideology while at the same time respecting the faith; this, after all, is what the many anti-fundamentalists Muslims do.
Second, fundamentalists do not comprise a single movement. While they share certain beliefs (“Islam is the solution”) and opinions (such as anti-Western attitudes), they differ widely among themselves in temperament and in specific policies. [33]
The last paragraph of the Communist Manifesto reads:
“The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.”[34]
And this includes two statements: that the existing social and political system Is to be changed by a revolution; and that a social revolution is to be identified with an overthrow of that existing social system by violence. [35]
[1] The English School. chapter 7 page 75 Griffiths, Martin (ed)
[2] Ibid page 76-77
[3] Ibid page 77
[4] Ibid page 79
[5] Explaining War: A comparison of Realism and Constructivism. http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/03/explaining-war-a-comparison-of-realism-and-constructivism/
[6] The English School chapter 7 page 78 Griffiths, Martin (ed)
[7] Ibid page 78
[8] Ibid page 79
[9] Ibid page 79
[10] Ibid page 79
[11] Ibid page 79-80
[12] Ibid page 80
[13] The English School. Chapter 4. Andrew Linklater. Pp 84-108
[14] Ibid page 88
[15] Ibid page 88
[16] Ibid page 90
[17] Ibid page 90
[18] The English School. Chapter 4. Andrew Linklater. Pp 84-108
[19] The English School chapter 7 page 78 Griffiths, Martin (ed) page 80
[20] Ibid
[21] Ibid
[22] Ibid page 81
[23] Ibid
[24] Ibid
[25] The English School chapter 7 page 78 Griffiths, Martin (ed) page 79
[26] Ibid 79
[27] Ibid 79
[28] Ibid 80
[29] Questions About Kant’s Opposition to Revolution. The journal of Value Inquiry 36: 283-298, 2002. Thomas E. Hill, JR. Department of Philosophy, The university of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
[30] Questions About Kant’s Opposition to Revolution. The journal of Value Inquiry 36: 283-298, 2002. Thomas E. Hill, JR. Department of Philosophy, The university of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
[31] Questions About Kant’s Opposition to Revolution. The journal of Value Inquiry 36: 283-298, 2002. Thomas E. Hill, JR. Department of Philosophy, The university of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
[32] Ibid page 284
[33] Islamic Fundamentalists are the New Big Threat to the West. Daniel Pipes. Philadelphia Inquirer. September 16, 1994. http://www.danielpipes.org/255/islamic-fundamentalists-are-the-new-big-threat-to-the-west
[34] Marx and Engels. Communist Manifesto.
[35] Marxist Theory on Revolution and Violence. Adam Schaff. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2708729?uid=3738496&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21102043482747
Desperate Pol.Scientists 